The Early Genocide Propaganda Accusation: Gaza, November 2023, and the Construction of a Twisted Narrative - Pallyweid

Only weeks after Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, false accusations of so called "genocide" was already pushed by Arab  anti-Israel groups.

The speed with which the term entered public discourse is significant. By November 7, only one month after the Hamas massacre and the beginning of Israel's military campaign, three Palestinian so-called "human-rights" organizations—Al Mezan, Al-Haq, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR)—were already describing the situation as an imminent genocide. Their joint statement called for an immediate end to what they described as Israel's supposed "genocidal warfare" and asserted that Palestinians in Gaza were facing "imminent genocide."

The November 7 statement was not a neutral description of an established judicial finding. It was an advocacy document produced by organizations that had already adopted a particular legal and political interpretation of the war. The statement combined casualty figures, displacement, shortages of food, water, fuel and medicine, destruction of infrastructure, and allegations of collective punishment with the conclusion that these developments constituted an imminent genocidal threat. 

In other words, the accusation functioned simultaneously as a legal allegation, and a mobilizing political message.

The distinction matters because genocide is a specific legal concept, not simply a synonym for mass civilian death or extensive destruction. Under the Genocide Convention, the crime requires prohibited acts committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The International Court of Justice later emphasized that the prohibited acts fall within Article II when accompanied by the requisite intent. 

The messaging intensified immediately afterward. On November 9, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC's president and co-founder: Salam Al-Marayati) published an article stating that "the world is witnessing a genocide" and attributing this to the Israeli government. The article framed the Gaza war through the language of genocide, media suppression, and international complicity. 

This illustrates how the terminology moved quickly from Palestinian so-called "human-rights organizations" into broader advocacy networks addressing Western and particularly American audiences.

The legal rhetoric also escalated. On November 9, Al-Haq, Al Mezan, and PCHR announced that they were calling on the International Criminal Court to investigate Israeli leaders for alleged genocide and incitement to genocide and to issue arrest warrants. The organizations' allegations were subsequently cited in South Africa's proceedings before the International Court of Justice. 

The significance of this development is that an accusation initially advanced through NGO statements was increasingly incorporated into formal international-law advocacy.

By December, the narrative had entered the anti-Israel Israeli and international left-wing media discussions in increasingly categorical terms. In a December 31, 2023 article in Local Call (aka +972mag), Meron Rapoport discussed the concept of "domicide" and the developing genocide accusation. The account quoted Palestinian Centre for Human Rights activist Khaled Sourani as explaining that his organization and Al Mezan and Al-Haq had initially described the situation as "genocide in the making" and had subsequently moved to the position that it was genocide. 

A similar process can be observed in the controversy surrounding B'Tselem. As testified by former B'Tselem public-department director Roy Yellin, reported in March 2024 by Haaretz and Walla, internal disagreements developed within the organization over how to respond to the Gaza war and whether B'Tselem should issue a unilateral call for an immediate cease-fire. An Arab-Palestinian employee had accused those refusing to support an immediate cease-fire of being partners in "genocide." Walla's report on Yellin's lawsuit likewise states that colleagues accused him of supporting "genocide" after he opposed the formulation of a unilateral cease-fire appeal. 

B'Tselem's Novak and Noy did not object to this accusation. 

The broader political context is also difficult to ignore. B'Tselem executive director Yuli Novak has characterized the October 7 Hamas attacks as "acts of resistance," while Orly Noy, chair of B'Tselem's executive board, is an editor at Local Call/+972 Magazine. Such statements and affiliations have contributed to a wider radical discourse.

All this demonstrate how rapidly the accusation became embedded in political advocacy after October 7. Before any final judicial determination, the word was already being used by NGOs, activist organizations, media figures, and political networks as a defining description of Israel's conduct.

From a critical perspective, the chronology matters. Israel was responding to an unprecedented massacre in which Hamas deliberately attacked Israeli civilians, murdered entire families, and took hostages into Gaza. The resulting war therefore began in the immediate aftermath of an armed attack by Hamas—not in a political vacuum. Any assessment of Israel's military conduct must account for that context, Hamas's continued armed activity, and its role in initiating the war.

The early deployment of the false genocide label largely displaced that context. By presenting Israel's subsequent military campaign primarily through the framework of genocide, advocacy organizations helped establish a narrative in which Israeli actions were interpreted from the outset as evidence of criminal intent rather than as contested actions undertaken during an ongoing war against Hamas.

The central issue, therefore, is not whether Palestinian Arab civilians suffered; nor is it whether Israeli military conduct should be subject to scrutiny. It is whether the extraordinary legal accusation of genocide was established through evidence and adjudication, or whether it was first constructed as an advocacy narrative and only subsequently treated as an established description of reality.

The chronology proves the latter: the genocide propaganda became a political and rhetorical framework remarkably early in the war, and its repetition across advocacy organizations, media, and international legal forums helped transform a contested allegation into one of the dominant narratives surrounding Israel.

References.

Al-Haq, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, & Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. (2023, November 7). As the death toll in Gaza exceeds 10,000 in a month, Palestinian organizations call for an immediate end to Israel's genocidal warfare against Palestinians. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. PCHR — November 7, 2023 statement

International Court of Justice. (2024, January 26). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel): Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures. ICJ — January 26, 2024 Order

International Court of Justice. (2024). Application instituting proceedings and request for the indication of provisional measures: South Africa v. Israel. ICJ — Application in South Africa v. Israel

Muslim Public Affairs Council. (2023, November 9). Lens on the ground: Journalists' toll reporting from Gaza. MPAC. MPAC — November 9, 2023

Heller, S. (2024, March 21). Former B'Tselem senior claims: "I was fired because I didn't agree to a unilateral call for a ceasefire". Walla. Walla — March 21, 2024

Kashti, O. (2024, March 24). Oct. 7 Hamas attack is tearing apart Israeli human rights group B'Tselem. Haaretz. Haaretz — March 24, 2024 article.